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The Strategic Use of Temporary  
Agency Work – Functional Change of  
a Non-standard Form of Employment 
Hajo Holst, Oliver Nachtwey, Klaus Dörre 
 
Using data from the German case, the paper examines a new form of cli-
ent firms’ utilization of temporary agency work that is distinctly different 
from traditional forms responding to production problems. Client firms, 
particularly from manufacturing, increasingly use temporary agency 
workers as a quasi-permanent component of their workforce. Manage-
ment’s primary aim is to establish a “security net” for the short-term-
profits by bypassing German statutory dismissal protection. However, 
since client firms’ regular employees and the temporary agency workers 
tend to perform the same tasks, a secondary effect of the strategic use of 
temporary agency work can be observed: the disciplinary effects associ-
ated with precarious work are tangibly amplified and expanded. 
Key words: temporary agency work, work, labour relations,  
corporate governance, Germany 
 
1. Introduction 
Temporary agency work (TAW) has experienced a dramatic development in 
Germany over the last economic cycle. First, no other industry experienced 
comparable job growth during the boom between 2005 and 2008. The num-
ber of workers employed by agencies more than doubled to over 800.000 on 
the eve of the current crisis (Bundesagentur 2008: 5). Manpower, Adecco and 
randstad, all international players, were the three largest growing employers 
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in Germany both in 2006 and in 2007, which reflects client firms’ increasing 
reluctance to directly hire workers covered by statutory dismissal protection. 
Second, in the same way the industry benefited from the boom years, it was 
subsequently hit hard by the economic crisis following the breakdown of the 
Lehman Brothers Bank in September 2008. Between 2008 and 2009, the 
number of temporary agency workers decreased by more than 300.000. 
Client firms particularly in the manufacturing sector retained their core 
workforces but laid off a huge number of their so called “temps”. Together, 
these two developments: the enormous expansion during the boom and the 
rapid contraction in the crisis, demonstrate the TAW-sector’s increasing 
responsiveness to the economic cycle, and moves the German sector closer to 
its counterpart in the US (see Theodore/Peck 2002: 479).  
The sector’s close link to the economic cycle is a direct consequence of 
the reform of its regulatory framework in 2003. Compared to the Anglo-
Saxon countries, Germany was traditionally characterized by a rather rigid 
regulation of TAW. In order to protect the standard form of employment, 
regulation constrained agencies’ arbitrariness as employers and restricted 
client firms’ use of TAW. In its initial version from 1972, the Labour Place-
ment Act limited the period a worker could be hired out to a client firm to 
three months, and prohibited the use of fixed-term contracts by agencies 
(Bode et al. 1994). Despites numerous reforms, the maximum period of 
assignment and the restrictions on fixed-term contracts remained corner-
stones of the German regulation until the end of the millennium. However, 
following a period of intensive lobbying by international agencies as well as 
powerful German business interests, the TAW-sector was deregulated in 
2003. The maximum-period of work assignments and the remaining restric-
tions of the use of fixed-term contracts were removed (Weinkopf/Vanselow 
2008). The reform enforced by the red-green government moved regulation 
in Germany closer to the traditionally liberal models in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Furthermore, due to its numerous exemption rules, the European 
directive on TAW, adopted in 2008, does not constitute a challenge to de-
regulation in Germany. Formally prescribing equal treatment of temporary 
agency workers and client firms’ regular employees, the directive opened up 
exemptions based on collective agreements.  
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The deregulation in 2003 laid the foundation for the remarkable develop-
ment of TAW in Germany in the subsequent years. The rapid expansion was 
not only a result of the sector’s penetration of new client firms and new 
industries; a growing number of large, world-market oriented corporations, 
the BMW-plant in Leipzig being the most prominent example, used the 
deregulation to alter their deployment of this non-standard form of employ-
ment (Dudenhöffer/Büttner 2006; Promberger et al. 2006). The assignments 
of temporary agency workers in these client firms differ both in quantity and 
in quality from traditional assignments. First, temporary agency workers’ 
share of the client firm’s workforce is comparatively high; thirty percent of 
workers in the BMW-plant are far from an exception. Second, and even more 
important, temporary agency workers constitute a quasi-permanent compo-
nent of the client firm’s workforce. They work side by side with the regular 
workers employed by the client firm, and both groups mainly perform the 
same tasks (similar: Ackroyd/Procter 1998; Kalleberg 2003). Thus, in con-
trast to the classical picture of the “flexible firm" (Atkinson 1984), contingent 
workers do not form a peripheral workforce in its narrow definition. Both 
groups of workers are highly interwoven in the labor process, despite the 
remaining status differences.  
Underlying this new form of assignment is a functional change of TAW 
closely associated with the shift to financial market capitalism. This implies a 
move, from an instrument used mainly reactively to adjust the workforce to 
short-term swings in work-load, to an instrument of strategic corporate 
governance. By employing a certain share of their permanent workforce 
through agencies, client firms bypass statutory dismissal protection and 
binding collective agreements in order to establish a “security net” for their 
short-term profits or rate of return. Thus, the strategic use of TAW is particu-
larly attractive for a management primarily oriented to the firm’s or corpora-
tion’s shareholder value. Permanently maximizing short term profits is one of 
the basic features of the increasing capital market orientation within corporate 
governance (Fligstein 2001). However, the link between the strategic use of 
TAW and financial market capitalism goes beyond the level of corporate 
governance. The radical deregulation of TAW in 2003 is more or less a direct 
expression of the general shift in capitalism from post-war Fordist capitalism 
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to financial market capitalism. While the post-war economic success of the 
Western countries rested to a certain degree on the decommodification of 
labour, the new economic regime increases market pressures and is thus 
based on recommodification (Harvey 2006; Dörre 2009). 
While the strategic use of TAW and its close link to capital-market ori-
ented forms of corporate governance has been described by business observ-
ers and scientists (Arrowsmith 2008: 7; CIETT 2010: 60; Dudenhöffner/Bütt-
ner 2006; Seifert/Brehmer 2008), neither the enforcement of the changed 
function of TAW within highly decentralized client firm organizations, nor 
its implications for work and labor relations have yet been analyzed in detail 
(similar: Kalleberg/Marsden 2005: 391). This paper attempts to fill this gap. 
Using evidence from a research project conducted at the University of Jena, 
Germany, the article explores the consequences of client firm’s strategic use 
of TAW on work and labour relations. Central management’s interest in 
stable profits as independent from market swings as possible might be taken 
for granted, but the implications for local management and supervisors 
responsible for production output are not all self-evident. A further concern is 
the impact of the quasi-permanent use of TAW on client firms’ regular 
employees and labour relations. As an employment relation, temporary 
agency work is associated with a high risk of precariousness (Castel 2000; 
Brinkmann et al. 2006; Dörre et al. 2004). Temporary agency workers oc-
cupy an in-between position as they reside inside of the client firm and the 
external labour market. Taken together, the hope to return to regular em-
ployment and constant threats of being send back to the agency, have a 
disciplining effect on the temporary agency workers’ work behavior. Due to 
rigid regulation, German client firms in the past only used temporary agency 
workers for short time spans (Noller et al. 2004). But what are the conse-
quences of the long-term, quasi-permanent assignment of precarious workers 
in the core of client firms?  
Following the introduction, the paper starts with a brief description of the 
regulatory framework of the TAW-sector in Germany, with a focus on its 
deregulation in the 2000s (2). In order to facilitate a systematic analysis of 
the enforcement of the strategic use of TAW, an ideal-type typology of client 
firms’ deployment is presented. The strategic use of TAW is distinguished 
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from two classical forms of client firm’s deployment of TAW, namely the ad-
hoc assignment and the flexibility buffer (3). Next is a brief presentation of 
the research project whose results are discussed in this paper (4). Using two 
contrasting case studies the consequences for work and labor relations are 
outlined. The first case, ExtruCo represents the use of TAW as a flexibility 
buffer to cope with a short-term peak in workload (5), while the second firm, 
TransCo, uses TAW strategically (6). The paper will conclude with a sum-
mary and a brief outlook into the next economic cycle (7).  
2.  The regulatory framework – deregulating temporary agency work 
Before turning to client firms’ deployment of TAW, a brief discussion of the 
development of TAW’s regulatory framework is useful. In the direct post-war 
period, TAW was banned in Germany. Hiring out labour to obtain profits was 
considered incompatible with the de-commodification of labor ingrained in 
the rising Fordist welfare state. Not until 1972 was TAW legalized. However, 
legalization was not tantamount to liberalization. Based on a broad political 
consensus, the standard employment relationship (SER) became the point of 
reference for the regulation of TAW in Germany. The aim of the Labour 
Placement Act was to serve German firms growing demands for flexible 
labour without allowing for renting out workers for the generation of profits 
(Bode et al. 1994; Aust/Holst 2006). First, differing from the UK and the US 
situation, German agencies were forced to respect full employer obligations, 
such as statutory dismissal protection, safety provisions at work and workers’ 
co-determination rights. Furthermore, the use of temporary contracts by 
agencies was restricted. Second, client firms’ use of temporary agency work-
ers was constrained by the introduction of a maximum period of assignment. 
In sum, the regulation of TAW in Germany reflected the decommodification 
of labour characteristic for the Continental and Northern European welfare 
states under conditions of Fordist capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990).  
In 2003, however, the traditional path of moving TAW as close as possi-
ble to the standard employment relationship by way of a rigid regulation was 
abandoned. In the context of the far-ranging deregulation of the German 
labour market based on the recommendations of an independent expert 
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commission led by Peter Hartz, a former manager of Volkswagen, the TAW-
sector was almost completely liberalized. Both the restrictions on the use of 
temporary contracts by agencies and the limitations on the period of assign-
ment in client firms were abolished (Weinkopf/Vanselow 2008). The high 
share of short-term contracts, less than fifty percent of all employment con-
tracts in the TAW-sector lasted more than three months (Bundesagentur 
2008: 12), indicates that agencies intensively use the new opportunities to 
externalize market risks. Equally manifest are the consequences of the abol-
ishment of the maximum period of assignment. Client firms can now assign 
jobs permanently to temporary agency workers. Thus, the reform opened the 
way for importing staffing strategies to Germany formerly only common in 
countries characterized by a low level of statutory dismissal protection, such 
as the UK or the US (Carnoy et al. 1997; Purcell et al. 2004; for a similar 
case in France: Beaud/Pialoux 2004).  
Despite its encompassing deregulation, one regulatory peculiarity still dis-
tinguishes the German TAW-sector from its Anglo-Saxon counterparts, 
namely the equal treatment paragraph of the Labour Placement Act. The Act 
contains an equal treatment paragraph which client firms, however, can 
bypass by means of a collective agreement. This paragraph presented an 
enormous bargaining incentive for employers as it allowed collective agree-
ments, both on sector and on firm level, to be used to undermine the equal 
treatment regulation. Following the reform, employers encouraged inter-
union competition by signing a collective agreement for the TAW-sector with 
an association of the so called “Christian” unions, a small employer-friendly 
organization. Since client firms could resort to this agreement to bypass their 
sector agreements, the large DGB unions including the IG Metall were forced 
to negotiate agreements with similar pay levels. Furthermore, inter-union 
competition prevented pay levels in the TAW sector from increasing signifi-
cantly in the subsequent years. Today, hardly any German temporary agency 
worker is not covered by an agreement (Kvasnicka/Werwatz 2002). For this 
reason, the deregulated Labour Placement Act does not violate the equal 
treatment article of the European directive on TAW adopted in 2008 (EU 
2008). While the directive’s provision that “the basic working and employ-
ment conditions “ of temporary agency workers should not differ from those 
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of the client firm’s regular workers caused some minor reforms in the UK, its 
exemption rules cover regulation in most member states including Germany 
(Weinkopf/Vanselow 2009). Furthermore, German regulation can be consid-
ered as an implicit “role model” for European regulation, since exemptions to 
equal treatment are allowed, either by means of a collective agreement for the 
TWA-sector or social partner consultation at national level (EU 2008). Thus 
both, German and European regulation, formally prescribe equal treatment 
but contain several loopholes client firms can use to discriminate against 
temporary agency workers. 
The fact that the reform in 2003 represented a radical path shift from the 
traditionally rigid regulation protecting the SER to a liberal model resembling 
regulation in the Anglo-Saxon countries raises the question of political 
reason. Why did the red-green government deregulate the TAW-sector in 
such an encompassing way? Besides conceding to ever-stronger lobbying 
activities by business representatives the reform was fuelled by two, at least 
partially, contradictory goals. The government aimed both at improving the 
general performance of the German labour market and at increasing the 
competitiveness of German firms. Both goals are expressed in the recom-
mendations of the above mentioned expert commission formulating the 
blueprint for the reform in 2003 (Kommission 2002: 41). In the field of 
labour market policy, TAW in its deregulated version should help to re-
integrate groups into the labour market particularly affected by high unem-
ployment such as young, long-term and low-skilled unemployed. In the eyes 
of the commission, experience as a “temp” would increase the employability 
of the unemployed and thus constitute a bridge into regular employment. In 
the field of economic policy, TAW in its deregulated version should “neutral-
ize” the statutory dismissal protection and thereby increase the competitive-
ness of German firms on international markets. Even though empirical evi-
dence indicates that “temping” does not increase one’s labour market 
chances, as we will see, both objectives still shape the regulatory framework 
of the German TAW-sector.  
The quantitative development of the German TAW-sector following the 
reform was quite remarkable. Although overall employment was still declin-
ing, the number of temporary agency workers started to increase immediately 
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after the reform, from 320.000 in 2003 to almost half a million in 2005 
(Weinkopf/Vanselow 2008: 5). The development in the following boom 
years was equally impressive. In 2006, the first year of growing employment 
figures, more than 50 percent of the newly established jobs in Germany 
occurred in the TAW-sector. Many firms were reluctant to expand their 
workforces and thus used TAW to build up flexible workforces. Although the 
share of overall employment declined in 2007 and 2008, temporary work 
agencies remained a locus of job growth. No other industry experienced a 
similar job growth. Until mid-2008 the number of temporary agency workers 
raised to 800.000 (Bundesagentur 2010: 15). However, in almost the same 
manner as the sector benefited from the boom, it was hit by the current 
economic crisis. Within a few months, employment numbers fell by 300.000. 
Client firms, particularly from the manufacturing sector, used state subsidies 
for short-time work to protect their permanent workers while laying off large 
numbers of temporary agency workers.  
3. Temporary agency work in client firms – a typology  
This section focuses on the use of TAW by client firms. For them, TAW is an 
instrument of external flexibilization. Temporary agency workers can be 
brought into the firm as well as returned to their agency with hardly any 
friction. However, client firms pursue very different goals by reverting to 
TAW, and deploy temporary agency workers in very different ways (for the 
German case: Promberger 2006; for the UK: Mckay/Markova 2008; for the 
US: Kalleberg/Marsden 2005; Davis-Blake/Uzzi 1993). The variety of client 
firms’ deployment of TAW is well described in the scientific discourse; yet a 
systematic analysis of the different motives of client firms and their impact 
on work and labour relations is still lacking. To fill this void, a typology of 
client firms’ deployment of TAW is presented. The typology builds on the 
extensive literature and our own research (Carnoy et al. 1997; Kalleberg 
2001; Purcell/Purcell 1998; Forde 2001; Theodore/Peck 2002). Three types 
of client firm’s utilization of TAW are distinguished: ad-hoc-assignment, 
flexibility buffer, and strategic use. Each of the three types is associated with 
a distinct function of TAW as an instrument of flexibilization as well as an 
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equally distinct form of assignment of temporary agency workers in the client 
firm’s labour process. While both the ad-hoc-assignment and the flexibility 
buffer represent traditional ways to use TAW, the strategic use is new and a 
direct impact of the reform of 2003. As the discussion of the development of 
regulation of TAW demonstrated, open-end assignments characteristic for 
this type of deployment were legally prevented prior to the reform of the 
Labour Placement Act in 2003.  
Table 1:  A typology of client firms’ deployment of TAW  




Strategic Use of TAW 
Function of TAW as an instrument of flexibilization 
Flexibility  substitution of absent staff increase of workload “security net“ for profits 
Cost reduction  search and hiring costs (wages) 
search and hiring costs 
(wages) 
lay off costs 
(wages) 
Form of work assignment in client firm 
Intensity  minimal medium to high (>5%) medium to high(>5%) 
Scope  punctual limited to fringes encompassing 
Duration  temporary temporary permanent 
Relationship regular 
staff – agency workers 
in labor process  
punctual interactions segmentation Interwoven 
 
Two dimensions are distinguished: the function of TAW as an instrument of 
flexibilization, and the form of the assignment of temporary agency workers 
in the client firms. The function of TAW represents the key difference be-
tween the three types, and refers to the objectives of a client firm’s utilization 
of TAW as an instrument of flexibilization. The form of assignment describes 
the positioning and use of temporary agency workers in the client firm’s 
labour process. The intensity of the assignment refers to the temporary 
agency workers’ share of the client firm’s workforce, the scope of the as-
signment relates to the pervasiveness of TAW in the client firm’s divisions, 
and the duration of assignment covers the temporal dimension. The construc-
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tion of the typology follows the principle “form follows function”. TAW’s 
function in the client firm structures the form of the assignment of temporary 
agency workers in the labour process. The impact for work and labour rela-
tions are in turn structured by the form of assignment, although room for 
political action moderating the impact and creating solidarity within the 
workforce exists.  
The first utilization type is the ad-hoc assignment. The impetus for the as-
signment of temporary agency workers stems from the sphere of production. 
Client firms temporarily assign jobs to temporary agency workers as a reaction 
to the absence of regular staff due to sick leave or holidays (see Theodore/Peck 
2002: 467). The flexibility of TAW is thus used by the client firm to maintain 
stability of its processes. The control problem of the ad-hoc assignment is 
“matching” (Walter 2005; see: Miegel et al. 2007: 15). To facilitate stability, 
temporary agency workers have to assume the positions of the absent regular 
workers and, thus, have to match the qualification demands of the client firm. 
The form of assignment is characterized by a low intensity, a limited scope and 
a short duration. Only a few temporary agency workers are present at a time 
since they only work in those departments where regular staff is absent. Tem-
porally, their assignment is confined to the absence of the regular workers. Due 
to the low intensity, the limited scope and the short duration, there are only 
punctual interactions between the client firm’s regular workers and the tempo-
rary agency workers. Evidence suggests that the impact of the deployment of 
TAW in form of an ad-hoc assignment has only a limited impact on work and 
labour relations. Therefore, the case studies in this article concentrate on the 
following two types, namely the flexibility buffer and the strategic use.  
The second type is referred to as flexibility buffer. As in the first type, the 
client firm’s utilization of TAW constitutes a response to production prob-
lems. Temporary agency workers are used to cope with a sudden and unex-
pected increase in production volume (see Kalleberg 2003: 157; Promberger 
et al. 2006: 92ff.). Again, the decision to deploy TAW is made on the shop 
floor. Supervisors use temporary agency workers to cope with the short-term 
work-load as the regular workforce is not expanded due to the distinct tempo-
rary character of the increase of the work load. Closely linked to the function 
of TAW is the control problem to be solved by client firms and agencies: 
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“availability”. In general, client firms need a high number of temporary 
agency workers on very short notice. In order to have a sufficient supply of 
labour at all times, agencies permanently recruit new potential workers but do 
not hire them before a concrete order is present (Kvasnicka 2003). The form 
of assignment typical for the flexibility buffer is characterized by a medium-
to-high intensity, a low-to-medium scope and a limited duration. The number 
of temporary agency workers is generally higher than in the case of an ad-hoc 
assignment, however, the scope remains limited. Since the assignment is 
directly linked to concrete orders causing the increase in workload, a tempo-
ral end is clearly defined. In the labour process, the client firm’s workforce is 
segmented. In order to increase output as quickly as possible, supervisors 
assign peripheral positions to the temporary agency workers, thereby mini-
mizing training costs. 
The newest type is the strategic use of TAW (see Forde 2001; Theodore/ 
Peck 2002: 471; Promberger et al. 2006: 109ff.). Differing from the classical 
modes, the impetus for the utilization of TAW does not stem from the sphere 
of production but from strategic corporate governance, hence the term strate-
gic use. This is a characteristic of the strategic use which distinguishes it 
from the two classical types: the decision to deploy TAW strategically is 
made by management, not on the shop floor. In conjunction with other in-
struments of external flexibilization, TAW is used to bypass statutory dis-
missal protection and binding collective agreements. The “not-so-
temporarily” temporary agency workers constitute a quasi-permanent com-
ponent of the client firm’s workforce (Kalleberg 2001: 488), thereby forming 
a reservoir of numerical external flexibility which can be used by to downsize 
the workforce in times of unexpected economic downturn, hence the notion 
of a “security net” for the short term profits or the rate of return. The control 
problem of the strategic use of TAW consists of the “stabilization” of a 
fragile relationship, since agencies have to guarantee that the same temporary 
agency workers are in place every day. Fluctuation among them would 
endanger the stability of the client firms’ processes. The form of the assign-
ment in the client firms clearly differs from the other two classical types. 
Intensity is in general higher though there are cases where labour representa-
tives succeeded in limiting the share of temporary agency workers. The main 
 The Strategic Use of Temporary Agency Work 119 
  
 
difference, however, lies in the scope and the duration of the assignment. 
Confronted with an open-end assignment of temporary agency workers, 
supervisors do not assign them work that is different from work performed by 
the client firm’s regular employees. In all our case studies, both groups of 
workers perform basically the same work; they work side-by-side and they 
participate in the same training schemes. Thus, in the labour process tempo-
rary agency workers and the regular employees of the client firms are closely 
interwoven, despite the persistent differences in status.  
Before turning to our case studies, two things need to be clarified. First, 
the three ideal-types are not mutually exclusive. Particularly the ad-hoc 
assignment is frequently combined with the other utilization types. In addi-
tion, in almost all client firms strategically deploying TAW we found single 
or groups of temporary agency workers whose assignment had the function of 
a flexibility buffer. The BMW-plant in Leipzig, one of the most modern car 
factories in Europe, can serve as an example. On the peak of the last boom, 
two groups of temporary agency workers were present, namely quasi-
permanent ones securing “basic flexibility” and short-term ones producing 
“peak flexibility”. However, evidence suggests that in each client firm there 
appears to be a dominant utilization mode shaping the positions occupied by 
temporary agency workers. The second point of clarification concerns the 
principle “form follows function”. Our case studies reveal that shop floor-
supervisors play a key role in translating the function of TAW into the form 
of assignment. Of the client firms, not one of the management teams exer-
cised any influence on job assignments. Supervisors responsible for produc-
tion output determine which positions workers took, regardless of whether 
they were the client firm’s regular employees or workers employed by work 
agencies. Let us now turn to the two case studies illustrating the conse-
quences of client firm’s utilization of TAW. 
4.  The project – the strategic use of temporary agency work in the 
German metalworking sector 
The paper builds on sociological research project the authors conducted in the 
German metalworking sector in 2007 and 2008 (Holst et al. 2009). The 
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sample consists of 12 company case studies whereof 6 were analyzed in 
detail by interviewing regular workers (RW), temporary agency workers 
(TAW), supervisors (SV), managers and works councils (WC). In addition, 
union and agency representatives were interviewed as well, leading to a total 
number of interviews of 83. The interviews were coded according to a code 
system developed on the basis of the research questions. Case selection was 
based on the topic of the project: the functional change of TAW. Interviewing 
managers and works councils, we targeted companies utilizing TAW strategi-
cally. In order to facilitate meaningful comparison, one firm using TAW as a 
flexibility buffer was studied intensively as a contrasting case. In general, 
access to firms proved to be difficult. In many cases, management and works 
councils refused to let their workforce be interviewed. Therefore, the compa-
nies studied in this project are presumably far from the worst examples in the 
field. Table 1 displays the six intensive case studies including important infor-
mation such as sector of origin, workforce size, the share of temporary agency 
workers of total workforce, utilization type as well as number and composition 
of interviews. The project was financed by the Otto-Brenner-Stiftung.  
Table 2: The intensive case studies 
Case Sector Workforce Share of TAWs 
Utilization 
Type Interviews 
ExtruCo Mechanical engineering 850 9% 
Flexibility 
Buffer 1 HR, 2 WC, 2 SV, 4 TAW, 4 RW 
 Electrical engineering 220 15% 
Strategic 
Use 1 HR, 1 WC, 1 SV, 4 TAW, 4 RW 
TransCo Mechanical engineering 660 18% 
Strategic 
Use 1 HR, 1 WC, 2 SV, 4 TAW, 4 RW 
 Electrical interconnections 950 21% 
Strategic 
Use 1 PA, 1 BR, 3 SV, 4 LA, 4 RW 
 Car maker 30.000 5% Strategic Use 1 BR, 2 SV, 4 LA, 4 RW 
 Automotive supplier 230 30% 
Strategic 
Use 1 PA, 1 BR, 2 SV, 4 LA, 4 RW 
 
In the subsequent sections, the implications of the strategic use of TAW on 
work and labour relations are analyzed in detail by means of a comparison of 
two contrasting case studies. Besides the utilization type, the two cases, 
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ExtruCo and TransCo, display several similarities, among them: sector of 
origin, product characteristics, firm size, and workforce skill-level. Both 
firms are machine building companies specialized on customized large 
machinery, both are medium-sized firms and, in addition, both possess a 
highly skilled workforce. Controlling for a whole range of factors, these 
similarities allow for a meaningful comparison of the implications of the 
differences in utilizing TAW. 
5.  Temporary agency work as a flexibility buffer –  
the divided workforce (ExtruCo) 
The first case represents the deployment of TAW as a flexibility buffer. 
ExtruCo is a machine building company specializing in the production of 
large machinery for the chemical and plastic industry. The plant is the origi-
nal location of a family-owned business that had a long tradition in machine 
building. However, for more than a decade the firm belongs to an interna-
tional corporation owned by shifting investment funds. During this time the 
workforce has been reduced in two large waves, to a minimum of 650 after 
the turn of the century. During the boom years 2006 and 2007, ExtruCo’s 
workforce was expanded through the recruitment of more than one hundred 
new regular employees. In addition, fifty temporary agency workers were 
hired through various agencies and brought into the firm. However, these 
workers were laid off in the course of the current crisis. At the end of 2009 
only a handful of temporary agency workers were still present in the plant. 
The majority of the workforce including the former temporary agency work-
ers consisted of skilled workers, most of them trained in the company. The 
focus on skilled labour reflects the character of the production system. The 
highly customized machines are produced and assembled in small semi-
autonomous work groups. Attempts to reintroduce a belt system proved to be 
incompatible with both the complexity of the products and shifting customer 
demands. Therefore, production is dependent not only on formal qualifica-
tions, but on workers’ experience and tacit knowledge as well.  
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Temporary agency work as a flexibility buffer –  
flexibilization as a response to shop floor problems 
ExtruCo used TAW to cope with the shifting order volume during the boom 
years. Due to the firm’s dependence on large and long-term construction 
projects, the future development of the firm’s key markets was, and still is, 
more or less predictable. Expecting a sharp decrease of demand after the 
boom years, the firm switched to recruiting temporary agency workers in-
stead of regular employees. In an interview, an HR-manager made clear that 
the push for the assignment of temporary agency workers originated from 
production problems: 
“It was obvious that our own capacities were not sufficient for increased 
workload.” (HR)  
The supervisors decided if and when temporary agency workers entered 
ExtruCo. Due to the frequently shifting workload resulting from the cus-
tomer-oriented production process the number of temporary agency workers 
employed varied frequently even during the boom years. In fact, temporary 
agency workers were constantly recruited and laid off to adjust the firm’s 
monthly workload. Continually fine-tuning the size of the workforce required 
close cooperation of the HR-department and the agencies. The machine 
building company co-operated with more than ten agencies at any one time to 
assure the availability of temporary agency workers both in terms of numbers 
and quality. Thus, the management of the external relationship with the 
agencies became an important focus of ExtruCo’s local HR-department. 
The form of work assignment was characterized by a deep segmentation 
of the workforce in the labour process. In all the case studies, we found that 
management did not exercise any considerable influence on the division of 
work within the departments. The decisions underlying the placement of 
workers, whether they were hired directly or through temporary work agen-
cies, were made exclusively by the supervisors responsible for production. 
They decided which worker would be put onto which position. At ExtruCo, 
instead of integrating temporary agency workers in the normal task rotations, 
supervisors in most departments decided to create new positions for the 
temporal agency workers. While the regular staff concentrated on core oper-
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ating activities requiring experience as well as tacit knowledge, the temporary 
agency workers were assigned standardized tasks with minimum training 
requirements. The rationale guiding this decision was elaborated by a mem-
ber of the firm’s works council: 
“There is this uncertainty: Will he stay or not? You invest in his training, 
integrate him into the group, he gets a good position – and then he is gone. 
This is a dilemma. I keep telling my supervisor: ‘You got to know that the 
temp might be gone tomorrow.’ Then we have a big problem.” (WC) 
By segmenting the workforce along the core-periphery axis, supervisors 
attempted to achieve two goals, first, the output of the department as a whole 
was increased as quickly as possible. The temporary agency workers assisted 
the regular workers, who then could concentrate on tasks of strategic impor-
tance. Second, the prospective functionality of the unit was guaranteed, as 
proven by the smooth cutback of temporary agency workers in the second 
half of 2009. When the temporary agency workers were laid off, the regular 
workers returned to their traditional positions. In fact, only in areas where the 
qualification requirements were low, such as logistics and internal services, 
both groups performed the same tasks.  
The divided workforce – distinction and exclusion 
The distinct temporal nature of TAW as a flexibility buffer resulted in a deep 
segmentation of the workforce. Only in a few areas located at fringes of the 
firm organization did temporary agency workers and the firm’s regular 
employees perform the same tasks. But what were the consequences for the 
workers? For the temporary agency workers in ExtruCo there was a high risk 
of precariousness in terms of wages, social integration, work content, partici-
pation and societal recognition. Wages were low, the pay level of the TAW-
sector’s collective agreement amounted to hardly more than fifty percent of 
the sector agreement covering ExtruCo’s regular workers. The limited time 
span of the assignment impaired the temporary agency workers’ social inte-
gration into the client firm’s workforce as well their participation in qualifica-
tion schemes. Even the most skilled temporary agency workers performed 
only standardized tasks, neither meeting their own expectations concerning 
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the quality of work, nor improving their labour market chances. In addition, 
“being a temp” continued to be associated with a low social status. However, 
although the temporary agency workers were aware of the fact that “the client 
firm can fire us any time”, they attempted to constantly impress their supervi-
sors: 
“I try to do the job the best I can. I have tried from the first day. My boss 
tells me: ‘This is your chance. You have to demonstrate your qualities 
again and again’.” (TAW) 
Evidence suggests that the temporary agency workers’ work behaviour in the 
firm was to a high degree determined by their external position on the labour 
market. Experience told them, that the direct path into regular employment 
was blocked. Against the background of a series of unsuccessful application 
activities, employment as a temp appeared to them as the sole chance remain-
ing to re-enter the labour market. This assessment reflects the closure in 
various segments of the labour market which itself is the result of the recent 
success of the TAW-sector in Germany, particularly the manufacturing 
sector. In most old industrial regions, very few jobs were available outside of 
the TAW-world.  
On first glance, the presence of temporary agency workers had very little 
impact on ExtruCo’s regular employees. Due to the segmentation in the 
labour process there was no formal competition for positions or promotion 
chances. Consequently, ExtruCo’s regular employees perceived the assign-
ment of temporary agency workers mainly as enhancing their own job secu-
rity. They were convinced that the firm would, as it did indeed later on during 
the crisis, send the temporary agency workers back to the agency before 
laying off regular employees. A key factor supporting this perception was 
ExtruCo’s handling of short-term swings in the workload during the boom 
years of 2006 and 2007. Although the working time accounts of the core 
workforce were filled due to frequent overtime work, temporary agency 
workers were constantly laid off and re-hired. Due to the positions the core 
workforce occupies in the labor process, they were hardly replaceable. How-
ever, even though the temporary agency workers did not constitute a personal 
threat to the job chances of the permanent workers their presence still had an 
impact. For several regular employees of ExtruCo, the temporary agency 
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workers working in close proximity physically embodied their own shrinking 
labor market chances. Having the mass redundancies of the early 2000s still 
in mind, a worker with more than 20 years of seniority said:  
“If they want to close the plant, they will close it. But it would be almost 
hopeless to find a regular employment contract somewhere else.” (RW)  
Set within the background of the deteriorating job chances in the external 
labor market, the permanent position at ExtruCo was perceived as a privilege 
to be defended at all cost. Therefore, the same closure of the labour market 
that hampered the re-entry of temporary agency workers, conveyed through 
ExtruCo’s use of temporary agency workers, also had a disciplining effect on 
the regular workers as well. 
The division of ExtruCo’s workforce was also reinforced by the behaviour 
of the works councils. Statutory interest representation has a long tradition in 
ExtruCo with the skill-level and the seniority of the workforce constituting 
the works council’s powerbase. Among the bargaining outcomes reflecting 
the power of ExtruCo’s works council were: a substantial wage premium to 
the collective agreement for the metalworking industry, the firm-level freez-
ing of the new performance-related pay system of the sector agreement and 
the preservation of the firm’s craft-based production system. However, due to 
the temporally limited work assignment and the relatively slow increase of 
the number of temporary agency workers, works councils did not use their 
bargaining power to improve the situation of the temporary agency workers. 
Confronted with a whole range of urgent questions concerning outsourcing 
and work organization, the discrimination of the temporary agency workers 
hardly attracted the attention of the works councils. For the temporary agency 
workers, however, this meant that they were virtually excluded from statutory 
interest representation. Additionally, due to the high pay level for regular 
workers, the wage differential within ExtruCo’s workforce was tremendous. 
Temporary agency workers were paid solely according to the TAW-sector’s 
agreement. In addition, in order to protect the company’s knowledge base 
works councils bolstered the supervisors’ decisions to assign just simple tasks 
to the temporary agency workers, thereby reinforcing the segmentation 
between both groups.  
126 Hajo Holst, Oliver Nachtwey, Klaus Dörre 
   
6.  The strategic use of temporary agency work –  
the interwoven workforce (TransCo) 
Specialized in highly customized transformers, TransCo is part of one of 
Europe’s major engineering corporations operating globally and listed at the 
stock-market. After massive job cuts in the early 2000s, the number of 
TransCo’s regular workers has remained rather stable at a level of 550. 
Supplementing the core workforce, around 120 temporary agency workers 
were more or less constantly employed between 2006 and 2008. From early 
2009 on, the number of temporary agency workers was step-wise decreased 
due to falling demand on TransCo’s key markets. However, contrary to the 
first case, the temporary agency workers were not laid off at once. Even at the 
end of 2009, more than fifty temporary agency workers were still in place. 
TransCo’s workforce is highly dominated by skilled workers as most posi-
tions suitable for unskilled labour were outsourced in the recent years. Most 
of the regular workers received their initial training in the firm, resulting in a 
high average seniority. There is one further difference to the first case, 
namely the production system. During the boom, TransCo’s production 
system was reorganized according to neo-taylorist principles. While in the 
past transformers were assembled in semi-autonomous work groups, produc-
tion and assembly are now integrated in a continuous-flow-system. Standard-
ized and differentiated tasks result in a tangible reduction of training re-
quirements.  
Strategic use of temporary agency work –  
flexibilization as a “security net” for profitability  
The function of TAW is defined in TransCo’s international headquarters. 
Long before the past economic boom, the central management decided to 
limit the number of employees in the corporation’s Western European loca-
tions. To do so, a workforce cap was introduced, fixing the headcount at each 
location. Due to the centrally defined workforce cap, local branches could not 
independently hire new regular workers. The German and the international 
headquarters of TransCo both had to approve each new hire. Even during the 
boom years TransCo’s regular workforce was only marginally expanded. The 
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head of the local HR-department elaborated the rationale underlying the 
workforce cap: 
“Against the background of the global plant landscape, the headquarter at-
tempts to reduce the risk that local decisions have a negative impact on fu-
ture flexibility. Here, the number of employees plays an important role. In 
the eyes of the global corporation, the German statutory framework for in-
dustrial relations (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) is no benefit. It impairs the 
flexibility to adjust the workforce.” (HR)  
The workforce cap is used by the corporation’s headquarters to control local 
branches’ staffing practices. Despite the massive increase of orders, the 
number of TransCo’s regular workers remained rather stable during the last 
boom. Central management refused to expand the local workforce. TransCo’s 
local management had to revert to subcontracting, in-house outsourcing, and 
temporary agency workers to process the increased workload. Suppliers were 
conferred the production of a whole range of simple parts, and in-house 
outsourcing extended beyond peripheral units such as logistics and services 
to quality control and simple production tasks. However, the long-term 
assignment of about 120 temporary agency workers, amounting to twenty 
percent of the firm’s workforce, represented the main local response to the 
central decision to cap the headcount. Most of the temporary agency workers 
were hardly temporary; at the time of the interviews, the assignment lasted 
already more than two years and an end was not in sight.  
In the labour process, TransCo’s regular workers and the temporary 
agency workers were closely interwoven. In almost all production and as-
sembly areas, both groups worked side-by-side and performed the same 
tasks. The encompassing incorporation into TransCo’s standard processes 
was the result of decisions made by the respective supervisors responsible for 
production output. Due to the long-term, open-ended utilization of TAW, 
supervisors tended to assign temporary agency workers and the regular 
employees similar positions in the labour process. One supervisor explained 
his situation with the following words: 
“In general, I treat all employees the same. I do not make a difference be-
tween temps and the permanent guys. I make a difference concerning the 
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qualification but not in status or in the assignment of position. In fact, I 
cannot make a difference since I have to guarantee the output.” (SV) 
Due to the relatively high number of temporary agency workers and their 
open-ended assignment, a task segmentation would have impaired workforce 
flexibility and thus negatively influenced productivity. An enabling factor 
was TransCo’s production system; the standardization of tasks in the con-
tinuous flow system reduced the need of tacit knowledge and experience, 
thus minimized training requirements. Due to the flexible-taylorist system 
workers’ substitutability was high despite the high skill level. However, it is 
important to note that the temporary agency workers were indeed treated 
equally with the firm’s regular workers in terms of their position in the labour 
process, but the status differences remained visible. Reflecting the function of 
TAW as an instrument to bypass German statutory dismissal protection, the 
positions of the temporary agency workers remained rather fragile. In princi-
ple, they could be sent home at any time. The status differences constituted a 
specific challenge to the supervisors, as they had to guarantee that members 
of both groups cooperated in the labour process and exhibited the same 
performance. For this reason, a group of supervisors lobbied for directly 
hiring at least some of the temporary agency workers, however, central 
management’s workforce cap could not be bypassed at plant level. 
The interwoven workforce – discipline and solidarity 
The high number of quasi-permanent temporary agency workers at TransCo 
led supervisors to assign them similar jobs in the labour process. Only in few 
areas were both groups systematically assigned different tasks. But what did 
it mean for the workers that both groups performed the same tasks? Concern-
ing the temporary agency workers, evidence suggests that the equal position 
in the labour process characterizing the strategic use of TAW slightly reduced 
the level of precariousness associated with this form of non-standard em-
ployment, without, however, eliminating it. In addition to their regular pay-
ment by the agency, they received a monthly premium paid by the client firm, 
considerably reducing the pay differential within the client firm’s workforce. 
Temporary agency workers, particularly those with extensive experience as a 
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temp, perceived the quasi-permanent nature of the assignment at TransCo as 
positive. The long duration and the open-ended employment facilitated a 
deeper social integration into the client firm’s workforce. Furthermore, the 
fact that most temporary agency workers occupied similar workplaces as the 
regular workers increased job satisfaction. A long-term temporary agency 
worker revealed his thoughts when his assignment in the machine building 
became quasi-permanent: 
“Well, the main point is that you remain here. Everything else is secon-
dary. Just that you don’t have to change jobs the whole time. Whenever 
you go to a new job you have to find your way into the place. You have to 
get acquainted with the colleagues, find the way to the company and so 
on. I say: ‘As long as I am here, my car finds the way. It drives on its 
own.’ It’s all very smooth here. It’s a very positive environment here. I 
had other experiences, fights between the colleagues and so on. That was 
horrible.” (TAW)  
The relative positive perception of their assignment at TransCo was in all 
cases based on a comparison with past experiences as a “temp”. The long-
term character of the assignment mediated a few of the negative effects of 
TAW as an employment relationship. However, when comparing themselves 
to the regular workers of the client firm almost all temporary agency workers 
still saw themselves as “second class workers”. They were aware of the fact 
that the client firm could lay them off at every moment. Reflecting their 
minor job chances on the external labor market, many interviewees equated a 
regular position in the client firm with a “jackpot in the lottery” (TAW). The 
desire to receive a regular job in the client firm constituted a powerful moti-
vation for the temporary agency workers. However, due to the workforce cap 
their chances remained rather low. Temporary agency workers could only get 
into permanent employment at TransCo as replacement for regular employees 
who had the left the firm.  
Concerning the impact on the regular workers, one thing was particularly 
striking, namely the high substitutability of TransCo’s regular workers, 
reflecting the lack of a task segmentation. Particularly in the assembly areas, 
each regular worker was surrounded by temporary agency workers who had 
the same qualification and performed the same tasks. Notwithstanding that 
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the high level of dismissal protection objectively prevented any direct substi-
tution of regular employees; the potential feasibility of substitution consti-
tuted a powerful disciplining mechanism: 
“The big question is: What happens, when the boom is over. I am really 
skeptical. It might happen that they tell me: ‘You can leave ‘cause the other 
one [a temp] is cheaper.’ What can I do? Tough luck. I don’t know how 
much the form still values my experience; that I have been here from early 
on. I don’t know if that still counts today – or if it’s unimportant.” (RW) 
Uncertainty about the future was the fundament of the disciplinary effect. First, 
the plant’s future prospects were insecure reflecting the competition between 
the corporation’s different locations in Western Europe. Second, while in the 
past qualification schemes and promotion chances were assigned according to 
status, current workers increasingly had to compete for better jobs. However, 
supervisors’ decisions in this competition remained in-transparent to many 
workers. In addition, some workers reported that individual supervisors ex-
ploited the uncertainty by threatening regular workers that they would be 
substituted by high-performing temporary agency workers.  
Labor relations at TransCo reflected the interwovenness of the workforce. 
As seen in all of the cases of the strategic use of TAW, works councils incor-
porated the interests of the temporary agency workers in some way in the 
firm’s statutory interest representation. The impact of the strategic use of 
TAW on work and labour relations should not be reduced solely to a disci-
plining effect. The fact that both groups, the temporary agency workers and 
TransCo’s regular employees, occupied similar positions in the labour proc-
ess opened up new potentials for co-operation and solidarity as well. In the 
words of an employee with twenty years experience: “We do the same and 
we have the same background” (RW). The majority of TransCo’s regular 
workers supported the works council in using its bargaining power to im-
prove the situation of the temporary agency workers. Among the results of 
works councils activities were: a monthly wage premium added to the salary 
paid by the agencies reducing the wage gap considerably, the deeper social 
integration into TransCo’s workforce and the active participation of tempo-
rary agency workers in the process of interest formulation. However, it is 
important to note that the centrally defined workforce cap was not negotiable 
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for the works council. Thus, the material situation of the temporary agency 
workers was successfully improved – but the status as a temp was beyond the 
scope of firm-level bargaining. In addition, TransCo’s works council’s 
bargaining power was tangibly undermined by the quasi-permanent status 
division within the workforce. In the words of the head of the works council: 
“The firm undermines the bargaining power of us [the works council] and 
the union. The rate of unionization is rather high in this plant. Manage-
ments uses it [the presence of the temps] to put pressure on the workforce 
in order to undermine our ability to strike.” (WC) 
One of the most important bargaining successes of TransCo’s works council 
was the codification of a quota limiting the number of temporary agency 
workers in the plant to one hundred twenty.  
7.  Conclusions – “stabilizing the instable” 
The paper started off with the observation that German client firms are 
increasingly utilizing TAW as an instrument of strategic corporate govern-
ance. Comparing two contrasting cases from a pilot study conducted in the 
German metalworking industry, this paper attempted to answer two closely 
interrelated questions: First, how is the new function of TAW enforced in 
highly decentralized firm organizations? And second, what is the impact on 
the client firm’s workforce, including both its regular employees and the 
temporary agency workers hired through a temporary work agency? Al-
though it has been shown that the assignment of temporary agency workers 
result in a tangible status division within the workforce, the consequences of 
a quasi-permanent assignment of precarious workers in the heart of client 
firms are not yet examined fully. 
First, evidence collected confirms the hypothesis that management’s main 
objective for using TAW strategically is to de-couple property from market 
risks. As works councils from all client firms representing the strategic use of 
TAW report, management is willing to bargain for almost every facet con-
cerning the situation of the temporary agency workers, with the notable 
exception of their status as employees of an external agency. In contrast, 
supervisors in firms utilizing TAW as a flexibility buffer exhibit some bar-
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gaining power over the employment status of their workers. Notwithstanding 
the reduction of labor costs by eluding binding collective agreements, central 
management’s main objective is to establish a “security net” for the com-
pany’s short-term profits or rate of return by bypassing German statutory 
dismissal protection. Not surprisingly, the strategic use of TAW is particular 
attractive for management oriented towards short-term profits or rates of 
return, displaying its affinity to a corporate governance unilaterally prioritiz-
ing the interests of the shareholders. The central management in all case 
studies uses effective leverage to enforce the new function of TAW, namely a 
workforce cap broken down on locations and individual departments. The 
number of regular workers is either limited directly by means of a numerical 
headcount (as in the case of TransCo) or indirectly through central defined 
budget restrictions. Through fine-tuning the workforce cap, central manage-
ment is able to indirectly exercise influence over the staffing decisions on the 
local level.  
As exemplified by TransCo, the workforce cap tangibly alleviates the 
room for manoeuvre of the supervisors responsible for production output. 
The number of regular workers is centrally defined; if they need additional 
labour to meet the production goals they have to resort to external labour. 
The strategic use of TAW thus results in a quasi-permanent status division 
within the client firm’s workforce. On the one hand, there is the group of 
regular workers directly employed; on the other hand, there are the temporary 
agency workers who are integrated in the client firm’s labour process though 
they are formally employed by an external company. Since both groups have 
to work closely together and exhibit the same performance-level, the status 
division of the workforce constitutes a challenge for the responsible supervi-
sors. They have to prevent the status differences from having a negative 
impact on output productivity. To achieve this goal, supervisors in all client 
firms cooperate closely with representatives from the agencies in order to 
forestall the unexpected exit of temporary agency workers. Particularly in 
periods of intensive recruitment, fluctuation among temporary agency work-
ers was high, causing production problems in all client firms. Some supervi-
sors therefore lobbied for a deeper social integration of the temporary agency 
workers to avoid conflicts between both groups of workers.  
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Second, what are the consequences for the workers? Independently from 
the way TAW is exploited in a client firm, the insecure position as a tempo-
rary agency worker is associated with increased vulnerability. Temporary 
agency workers are confronted with relatively high job insecurity. Having 
experienced unemployment, most of the workers understand the work in the 
client firm as their only chance to re-enter regular employment. Their weak 
position on the labour market explains the hopes temporary agency workers 
associate with their job, although most of them sense that their chances of 
success are rather low. However, in our case studies, whether they used TAW 
strategically or not, the disciplining effect extended beyond the group of the 
temporary agency workers. The study thus confirms earlier analysis on the 
consequences of precarious work. Although regular workers formal job 
security remains unaltered, they are subjectively put under pressure. The 
interplay of intensified global competition, the deregulation of the welfare 
state, and new production concepts results in an increased collective risk of 
social deprivation even for the skilled employees (Beaud/Pialaoux 2004: 259; 
Vogel 2009: 12; Castel 2000: 258). Looking at the temporary agency work-
ers, the regularly employed workers of the client firm sense that, in case they 
would lose their job, their chances of re-entry into regular employment would 
be equally low. In a sense, the temporary agency workers physically embody 
the uncertainty surrounding their own future on the labour market.  
However, the comparison of ExtruCo and TransCo demonstrates that the 
strategic use of TAW has effects on the workforce that go beyond those 
described in previous studies on precarious work. By “stabilizing the insta-
ble”, i.e. the quasi-permanently integration of temporary agency workers, the 
client firm’s regular workforce is moved even closer to the market. At 
TransCo and the other cases representing the strategic use of TAW, the 
regular employees and the temporary agency workers possess the same 
qualifications and perform the same tasks. Thus, the individual risk of substi-
tution increases significantly. In contrast, the strict task segmentation mini-
mized regular employee’s substitutability at ExtruCo, which represents TAW 
as a flexibility buffer. The changed function of TAW underlying its strategic 
use indirectly lays the foundation for an increased intra-workforce competi-
tion leading to work intensification. Though the disciplining effect is not the 
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primary reason for utilizing temporary agency workers quasi-permanently, 
management in most client firms is aware of this “beneficial side-effect”. In 
the words of the HR-director of TransCo: 
“Temporary agency workers have mostly experienced several workplaces 
and thus have a positively impact on the situation in our plant. We do have 
very many employees – I almost said: who were born here – who were 
trained here and who will go into retirement here. They have never ex-
perienced another workplace but constantly complain about the working 
conditions, working time and so on. It is in these cases that the experi-
ences of the temps are helpful: ‘Gosh, be happy about the conditions in 
this plant.’ […] Furthermore, the temps demonstrated that some tasks can 
be performed faster which, of course, is connected to the hope for a regu-
lar job.’ (HR) 
Thus, as a secondary effect, the strategic use of TAW lays the foundation for 
the regulation and control of work by competition. 
Not surprisingly, the way client firms deploy TAW has a distinct implica-
tion for labour relations as well. While the temporary agency workers consti-
tute some sort of a temporary peripheral workforce in the case of the flexibil-
ity buffer, the strategic use of TAW is characterized by a tight interwoven-
ness of temporary agency workers and the client firm’s regular employees. 
For long periods of time, both groups perform basically the same tasks. Thus, 
as exemplified by the two case studies, client firms’ use of TAW as a flexibil-
ity buffer and its strategic use constitute very different challenges to works 
councils and unions. Whereas the interests of temporary agency workers who 
form a temporary peripheral workforce might be downgraded in negotiation 
processes, those working permanently in the core areas of the client firm’s 
organization constitute an important factor for the labor relations within the 
client firm. However, the relationship between the mode of TAW’s utiliza-
tion and the politics of works councils and unions is far from deterministic. 
Evidence shows that there is room for political mobilization and solidarity 
building among workers. Due to the dual system of interest representation in 
Germany, unions cannot directly control works council behaviour. However, 
unions such as IG Metall aim at “activating” works councils to incorporate 
the interests of temporary agency workers into their bargaining strategies. 
Several activities display the metal union’s growing orientation towards 
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TAW, including a national campaign promoting equal treatment on the firm-
level and several projects aiming at consulting works councils and organizing 
temporary agency workers (Dörre et al. 2009). However, due to the deregu-
lated regulatory framework success is dependent on the bargaining context 
within the client firm and works council’s willingness to take up the tempo-
rary agency workers’ grievances. 
Currently only a few of the metalworking industry firms use TAW strate-
gically. However, there are several powerful arguments for an accelerated 
dissemination of these concepts during and after the current crisis, even 
beyond the group of world-market oriented large corporations. First, the 
growing volatility of many product markets will potentially increase the 
popularity of a decoupling of property and market risks among managers of 
all kinds of companies. In addition, work intensification as a side-effect of 
the strategic use of TAW might become a driver for its further dissemination. 
Second, the trend to neo-taylorist production systems in manufacturing is 
lowering the barriers for an encompassing and quasi-permanent assignment 
of temporary agency workers. Training requirements are reduced because of 
workers’ experience and tacit knowledge are less important than in craft-
based production systems. Third, success of the TAW-sector is a self-
reinforcing process. The more client firms in a given sector resort intensively 
to TAW, the chances of unemployed workers to return directly into regular 
employment are lower, resulting in a growing reservoir of potential labor for 
temporary work agencies. Together, these factors make a further dissemina-
tion likely, beyond the group of large world-market corporations as well as 
internationally.  
But does this mean that both the further dissemination of TAW’s strategic 
use and its negative impact on the quality of work are inevitable? Not neces-
sarily, the German case studies reveal several starting-points for reformative 
actions by labour representatives. First, although the workforce cap has 
proven to be a powerful instrument to enforce the new function of TAW, 
works councils and unions have had some success in limiting its effect by 
negotiating a maximum quota for temporary agency workers. In fact, a quota 
is currently the only effective instrument alleviating the leverage of a work-
force cap. Second, the fact that temporary agency workers and the regular 
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employees of the client firm occupy similar positions in the labour process 
has proven to be a double-edged sword. Besides the disciplining effects it 
entails, there is potential for an enhanced solidarity overcoming the work-
force division at least partially. If unions as well as works councils incorpo-
rate the interests of the temporary agency workers into their strategies, the 
consequences of the strategic use of TAW can at least be moderated. In all 
the case studies, it was the supervisor’s behavior that emerged as an impor-
tant factor for shaping the relationships between both groups of workers. 
They regulate and control the work of both the client firms’ regular employ-
ees and the temporary agency workers. However, while solidarity might 
mediate the effects of the deprivation associated with the status of being a 
“temp” in Germany, real equal treatment presupposes a reform of the legal 
framework of the TAW-sector exceeding tangibly the scope of the European 
directive on TAW as well as reform of the social security systems still cen-
tered around the standard employment relationship.  
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